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O. Introduction
In the literature on the empirical explanation of trade flows, it appears to have become a universally accepted dictum that the existence of so-called "intra-industry trade", i.e., trade between countries of products within the same industrial category, is prima facie evidence of the existence of economies of scale or monopolistic competition, or both, and in particular is incompatible with the "factor-proportions theory", by which is meant the theory developed by Heckscher and Ohlin according to which trade flows among countries are explained by differences in their relative factor endowments, it being assumed that production functions among countries are the same.
In this paper I shall argue, both on empirical and theoretical grounds, that there is nothing in the empirical observations of international trade statistics that cannot be explained perfectly easily by the "Heckscher-Ohlin theory" as formulated by Lerner <1933) and Samuel son (1953) .
(I shall refer to this as the HOLS model.) I do not wish to contend that alternatives to this theory are not worth exploring and developing; but if so, the reason for doing so should not be that the more conventional theory is unable to explain the observed facts.
In the last analysis, that theory should be accepted which is able to explain them best; but before this can be done, a dearer understanding is needed of the extent to which the conventional theory is or is not able to do so.
The belief that it is not able to do so is, in my opinion, based on a misunderstanding of the nature of that theory and a lack of appreciation of its rich potentialities.
In section 1 I examine some empirical evidence which points to the conclusion that if commodity classification systems were to carry the disaggregation process sufficiently far, two-way trade could be expected to disappear from international trade statistics.
In section 2 I consider the pure theory of international trade in the textbook case of two countries, two commodities, and two factors, and come to the conclusion that if (as is alleged to be the case in the literature on intra-industry trade) production processes are very similar as between the two commodities and factor endowments are very similar as between the two countries, it is possible for each country to export up to 50 percent of the output of its export good, the percentage increasing as the production processes become more similar.
Finally, in section 3 I consider the frequently repeated assertion that, when there are three or more countries, one would under the " factor-proportions theory" expect to find less trade between countries with similar than with dissimilar endowments; I find instead that, assuming identical and homothetic preferences within and across countries, if the two countries with similar endowments export goods with similar production processes, they may be expected to trade more with each other than with the third country, this effect being further accentuated when (1) there is a strong relative world preference for the goods which they export, or (2) when their absolute endowment levels are greater than those of the third country, or both.
1. Some empirical evidence Brubel & Lloyd (1975, pp. 86-9 ) distinguish between two types of intra-industry trade: trade in goods which are close substitutes in use but produced by different production processes (e.g., wood and metal furniture); and trade in goods which are not close substitutes in use but are produced by very similar or identical production processes (e.g., steel bars and sheets).
They also consider a third type of goods, such as automobiles, which are close substitutes and are also produced by similar processes. but given the limitations of data, presumably this is the best one can do. Table 2 gives the parameter estimates and the coefficient of 2 ** determination (R ) , where 1-R*~ is defined as in Theil (1971, p. 164) as the ratio of the sum of squares of the residuals P-100+aS to the sum of squares of the observations on the dependent variable P. Figures la, lb, and lc show the curves and the corresponding data points (represented as asterisks). Thus, for all of the individual countries and groups, the curves predict that intra-industry trade will cease to be observed if the SITC is refined to the ninth level of disaggregation; and for all countries together, to the tenth level.
Australian Intra-industry Trade, 1968-69 FittQd to thQ function P = 100 -aS~b
SITC level of disaggrQgation FittQd to the function P = 100 -aS~b As explained by Grubel & Lloyd (1975, p. 26) , the Balassa measure has the disadvantage of being an unweighted average of the ratios 1X^ + Iij|/(Xj + Mj); if instead we weight industry i by its importance, (Xj + Mj ) / E (Xj + Mj), we obtain
The Grubel-Lloyd measure corresponds to 1-C (times 100). The latter has the advantageous property of being necessarily nonincreasing as the degree of aggregation becomes finer Ccf. Grubel & Lloyd (1975, p. 23 This has the property that inter-industry trade, corrected for trade imbalance, has the value 0 at the null (5=0) level of di saggregati on. (1.2) (times 100) and for the number of aggregated subcategories at each SITC level (the parameter n of (1.2)). Table 4 provides the estimates of the parameters a and b of (1.4), the coefficient of determination (R"") , and the 100X cutoff point (S ) , i.e., the value of S that solves B=l in (1.4). The fitted curves are shown in Figure 2 . France I Table 4 West German Inter-Industry Trade, 1973 Parameters (a,b) of the power function, coefficient of determination (R a ) and 100"/. cutoff point (S~) , for the data of The curves for West German inter-industry trade with Belgium and France lend some support the hypothesis that intra-industry trade in basic materials is more of a "statistical phenomenon"
than is intra-industry trade in finished products, since they predict that intra-industry trade in the former will cease to be observed at the twentieth and tenth levels of disaggregation respectively, whereas it will continue to be observed in the latter up to the twenty-third and twelfth levels respectively.
But this conclusion depends upon a willingness to extrapolate curves far from the observations used to fit them.
In the case of French inter-industry trade, Gray (1978, p. 106) 
provides calculations of the Balassa coefficients for
French trade with Belgium, West Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom in SITC categories 6,7, and 8. These figures are reproduced in Table 5 . Table 6 Fitted to tho function B = aS~b Tables 7 and 8 for two different modes of calculation.
In the first, when a k-digit category is trivially refined to a (k+D-digit category by adding a zero to the code but not subdividing the category, this (k+D-digit category is included in the calculations; in the second mode it is excluded.
Tables 9 and 10 furnish the coefficients of the fitted curves, the coefficient of determination, and the 100% cutoff point, corresponding to Tables 7 and 8 respectively. The fitted curves for the pooled data in these two cases are displayed in 2. The two-commodity, two-factor, two-country case
The thesis was presented by Grubel and Lloyd (1975, pp. 88-91 ) that (1) a preponderant amount of intra-industry trade takes place in industries within which production functions are very similar to one another, between countries with very similar factor endowments, and that (2) this fact is inconsistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin theory with its assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale. In this section I take issue with the second of these propositions, and show that this type of intra-industry trade is readily explained in terms of the HOLS model.
In their words (Grubel & Lloyd, 1975, pp. 88-89) :
... in certain industries, developed countries tend to produce large numbers of substitute products with input requirements ... so similar that they may be considered identical.
The Heckscher-Ohlin model also assumes the identity of production functions across countries. ... therefore Csicl the constant rates of transformation between these products and their relative prices must be the same across countries.
As a result the exchange of these commodities with identical input requirements for each other is not profitable, because profits arise from the exploitation of differences in relative prices among countries.
Yet we observe the exchange of such products.
The inconsistency between the theory and reality can be explained by relaxing either the assumption that the production functions are identical across countries or the assumption that there are no economies of scale.
The assumption that the rates of transformation will be the same across countries requires the additional assumption of identical factor endowments; however, this seems to be implicitly assumed, since the authors subsequently state (p. 91) that "countries trading in these products have similar endowments with human, knowledge and real capital relative to labour and land."
In terms of the standard two-commodity, two-factor, twocountry model, the case discussed by Grubel and Lloyd may easily be analyzed in terms of the well-known "Lerner diagram" Ccf. Lerner (1933) , Chipman (1966) 3.
In Figure 5 a case is shown in which the production isoquants (which are the same for the two countries) are extremely close and the diversification cone very narrow. It is assumed that commodity i uses factor i relatively intensively (i=l,2). Suppose country 1's endowments lie at one edge of this cone (with the higher ratio of factor 1 to factor 2) and country 2's at the other.
Then country 1 will specialize in the production of commodity 1, and country 2 will specialize in the production of commodity 2; both countries will be on the verge of diversifying. Now suppose the two production functions are completely symmetric to each other in their arguments, and suppose further that consumers in both countries have identical and homothetic, and also symmetric, preferences. Then it is clear that in world equilibrium the prices of the two commodities will be the same. To specialize the assumptions still further A country with resource endowments £ = (£ t , £^i has technology characterized by isoquants I(, 1^ in situation 1 and li'i !=' in situation 2. In situation 1, the endowment vector 5 is allocated between industries according to v' x + v^ = £, where v'j = (VJJ, Vaj); the diversification cone is ££0££. In situation 2, this cone shrinks to &i'0££' in such a way that £ is close to the lower edge of the cone; the endowment vector £ is now allocated between the two industries according to v£' + v=' = £. A much larger fraction of resources is devoted to industry 1 (the export industry) in the second situation than in the first.
In the limit, as £{_' approaches £, all the country's resources are allocated to industry 1, and since (with unit prices) half of the export good is consumed, the other half is exported. Now suppose we make the fallowing construction. Let production functions be quite disparate (but still symmetric to each other), as indicated by the outside isoquants in Figure 5 , but let the factor endowments remain close as before.
Then the respective countries' resource allocations will be very close, and there will be very little trade. Now let the isoquants become closer and closer, until they reach the narrow diversification cone, that is, until the diversification cone is bounded by the given endowment vectors. Then each country will export a larger and larger proportion of the good in which it has a comparative advantage, up to the limit of one-half of its export good.
Let us now make this argument more precise. be satisfied, where £^ denotes the endowment of country k in factor i (i,k=l,2). Let preferences be given by (2.1) for both countries.
World equilibrium may then be computed as follows.
First, denoting the rental of factor i by w^, and assuming diversification of production in both countries, factor rentals are solved for by setting prices equal to minimum unit costs. The Given that both countries are assumed to be diversifying, and that the production functions (2.2) satisfy the hypothesis of absence of factor-intensity reversal, we obtain from (2.10) and Our object is now to show that, at least under certain additional hypotheses, these export-output ratios will increase as production functions become more similar. The additional hypotheses will impose complete symmetry as between the two commodities, factors, and countries. Specifically, I shall assume that iij = Ur> = 1 and fi^^ = /3 7 j; the latter of course implies /3j ^ = i3 77 , providing complete symmetry as between production functions. To obtain symmetry in consumption we set 8± = &2 = 1/2, and to have symmetry as between the countries' 1 "7 1 "? 11 factor endowments we set £* = £^ and £*-, = £T, where JJj > £*?
(country k is relatively well endowed in factor k). With these symmetry assumptions, the solution of (2.14) may be bypassed, since clearly pj = p 2 -Without loss of generality it will be assumed that p^ = p 7 =1, and for convenience we shall denote /3 = /3j-7 = /3-?i and 1-/3 = /3^j = /So-?-Since we assume $n > Sj?)
this is equivalent to /3 < 1/2.
With these symmetry assumptions, (2.8) reduces to (2.18) = (1-/3) * 0/30 .
Thus, it is interesting to note that for /3 < 1/2 both factor rentals are decreasing functions of /3; that is, factor rentals decrease as production functions become more similar. The inverse factor-output matrix now becomes
and we find that 
nold in tne m°d "el (2.1), (2.2), (2.3), if commodity j uses factor j relatively intensively (# < 1/2) and country k is relatively well endowed in k i factor k (i^ > £jj for j # k) , and if both commodities continue to be produced in both countries, then as the production functions become more similar (i.e., /3 increases), each country's exports increase as a proportion of the output of the export good. It was stated by Grubel and Lloyd (1975, p. 91 ) that "it is highly unlikely that the minor differences in input requirements between goods within ... industries could lead to the large observed trade if production were subject to constant returns to scale." But, as the above theorem and figure show, the more minor the differences in input requirements, the greater is the percentage of output exported, and the more sensitive is the percentage exported to narrowing of the differences between production functions. Suppose that all goods in an "industry" used factors in identical proportions-that is, had identical factorintensities. In this case factor proportions theory could not explain intra-industry trade.
For this purpose an industry must be defined in terms of the statistical classification used in the intra-industry calculations.
Usually the SITC three-digit classification is used though, with even narrower definitions, substantial intra-industry trade apparently remains.
It follows that, in such a case, other theories "must explain intra-industry trade.
One could argue by analogy with the indeterminacy in the size distribution of firms in an industry under constant returns and competitive equilibrium, that either the constant-returns or the competitive assumption (or both) must be relaxed in order to yield a determinate theory.
But the indeterminateness involved in the present case results from the totally improbable assumption that production functions and resource endowments are exactly the same; let them differ in only the slightest degree, as in the above example, and determinacy is restored. 3. The three-commodity, three-factor, three-country case
The following statement by Hufbauer and Chilas (1974, p. 3) appears to express a widely-held and unchallenged point of view:
Neoclassical trade theory once predicted that trade would wither between similar nations. After all, trade supposedly compensates for factor endowment disparities or differences in tastes, and if these disparities or taste differences are modest, the need for trade is smal1.
No references to "neoclassical trade theory" were cited to support this contention, and I doubt whether they could be easily found.
Ricardo discussed the question of the direction of trade between two countries, but as far as I know he never concerned himself with explaining the amount of trade. The same appears to be true of neoclassical and, in particular, the Heckscher-Ohlin theory. But whether or not sources could be found for such a proposition, the result of the previous section shows it to be incorrect.
Somewhat similar contentions are frequently made in contexts that are relevant only if trade among more than two countries is involved.
Fairly typical is the following argument put forward by Gray (1980, p. 447) :
... a preponderant amount of international trade takes place among industrial nations with relatively similar resource endowments. ... this pattern of international trade cannot be readily accounted for by the orthodox, factor-proportions theory of international trade even in its multiple-factor version.
The standard theory would suggest that the larger trade flows would take place among nations with markedly different factor endowments.
The only proposition known to me that relates trade patterns to relative factor endowments is the "Heckscher-Ohlin theorem", which states that if there are two countries, two factors, and two commodities produced competitively under constant returns to scale and freely traded with zero transport costs, and if (1) preferences are identical and homothetic within and between countries, (2) production functions are identical as between countries, (3) there are no factor-intensity reversals, and (4) trade is balanced, then each country will export the commodity in which its relatively abundant factor is used relatively intensively.
If any of the above four conditions is removed, it is easy to construct a counterexample to the proposition; in fact, much of the literature on the "Leantief paradox" was devoted precisely to such exercises. Thus, very special assumptions are required even in the simple 2x2x2 case to obtain unequivocal results; and even then, the results concern only the direction of trade, not the amount of trade.
Let us consider now a model of three countries, each producing three commodities with three factors. Countries 1 and 2 will be "similar" in their factor endowments, and they will have a comparative advantage in producing commodities 1 and 2, which have "similar" production functions. The object is to show that countries 1 and 2 may trade more, even much more, with each other than with the third country.
To produce some definite examples, I shall as in the previous section assume that production functions in each country have the Cobb-Douglas form i.e., the distance between them after they have both been normalized to unit length.
World equilibrium is solved for in the following manner. It is assumed that the equilibrium is one in which each country produces all three commodities, hence in view of the assumption that the countries have identical production functions, and of the form (3.1) (ruling out factor-intensity reversal), factor rentals are equalized; therefore, each country produces according to the same technical coefficients. World national product is then determined by the world national-product function where yj = 3TT/3pj.
To compute (3.6) and (3.7), we first obtain the factor rentals; this is done by solving from the system of minimum-unit-cost functions where v^ = 1/f j (/3* j , H^ z , /3-r z) , given that this system is linear in the logarithms of the pj/Vj and w^ .
From these factor rentals, the matrix of factor-output coefficients bj^ = fljjPj/w^ is obtained, and the world outputs (3.7) are obtained by solving the system of equations
World national product, (3.6), is then obtained from (3.10) Y = E pjyj .
From (3.10) and the assumption that world preferences are identical and homothetic and are generated by (3.3), world consumption is given by (3.11) Xj = fl
The system of equations to be solved to obtain world equilibrium prices is obtained by setting demand equal to supply for two out of the three commodities (since the third equality will follow by Walras' law); we may write this in the form (3.12) p jyj = t?jY (j = l,2), where y^ and Y are obtained from (3.9) and (3.10), and Xj from (3.11).
To solve the equations (3.12), Wolfe's (1959) using the factor-output coefficients k k k j/w^, the w^ being k V V V obtained from the pQ via (3.8).
The norm of p"=(p£,p 2 ) is defined as One of the columns, p , of (3.13) of maximal norm (3.15) is then dropped and replaced by p; from the new price vector, the factor rentals w^, the factor-output coefficients b^j, the outputs yj, As r increases, i.e., as the relative share of world expenditure devoted to commodities 1 and 2 increases, the ratio of trade between countries 1 and 2 to trade between countries 1 and 3 increases. The same is true as t increases, i.e., as countries 1 and 2's absolute endowments increase relative to country 3's. Table 12 gives the ratio of trade between the similar countries and trade between dissimilar countries as a function of t and r; note that the relationship between this ratio and the scale factor t is linear, for each r.
It seems quite reasonable to assume that there is a preponderance of world expenditure on the products of industrial countries which are similar to each other in both their endowments and in the production processes on which they concentrate; and that these countries have higher absolute productivity (whether measured by t in (3.18) or by the p.z in (3.1)-which we have assumed = 1). Thus, there are three forces all of which lead to greater trade between similar countries:
(1) similarity in the production functions for the goods which they export-a circumstance which (as we saw in the previous section) makes for more intra-industry trade; (2) greater world demand for their products; and (3) greater absolute productivity of the similar industrial countries compared to the dissimilar one. 
